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subfield of labor economics and the substantial shifts in work organization that have taken place since the
1990s. Understanding how and why firms have reorganized work opens the door for a renewed interest in
institutional approaches. The author explains that the rules of institutional labor markets (ILMs) emerge from
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government—and competing views of firms’ objectives—resulting in the rise of ILMs, the slow diffusion of
High Performance Work Systems, strategies used to obtain a high level of commitment from workers, the use
of contingent employees, and the spread of new promotion rules in response to equal employment
opportunity pressures. As such, the role of power and influence in establishing work rules is of central
concern, though more conventional NPE considerations also remain important.
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The author illustrates the utility of institutional labor economics and makes a 
case for a reconsideration of it. Two recent developments motivate this effort: 
the rise of New Personnel economics (NPe) as a significant subfield of labor 
economics and the substantial shifts in work organization that have taken place 
since the 1990s. understanding how and why firms have reorganized work 
opens the door for a renewed interest in institutional approaches. The author 
explains that the rules of institutional labor markets (Ilms) emerge from the 
competition between organizational interest groups—unions, personnel pro-
fessionals, and the government—and competing views of firms’ objectives, 
resulting in the rise of Ilms, the slow diffusion of High Performance Work 
Systems, strategies used to obtain a high level of commitment from workers, 
the use of contingent employees, and the spread of new promotion rules in 
response to equal employment opportunity pressures. As such, the role of 
power and influence in establishing work rules is of central concern, though 
more conventional NPe considerations also remain important.
A chestnut in any course on industrial relations includes a review of old debates 
between the so-called institutionalists and 
more mainstream labor economists. lester 
(1946) and machlup (1946) debated the 
role of equilibrium and marginal analysis in 
labor economics and lampman (represent-
ing what he termed the “empiricists”) and 
rottenberg (representing mainstream the-
ory) argued about realism and the standards 
against which theory should be judged 
(lampman and rottenberg 1956). The local 
labor market studies of reynolds (1951), 
myers and Shultz (1951), and others cri-
tiqued the standard assumptions of mobility 
and perfect information and these scholars 
believed that “where frictions, imperfec-
tions, and the ‘human element’ in labor 
markets bulk larger . . . the competitive . . . 
model frequently gives answers that are in-
correct, misleading, or unduly narrow and 
simplistic” (Kaufman 2008: 287). 
by the mid-1960s these disputes seemed 
to have been settled with the rise of human 
capital theory and the elaboration of search 
and information models that accounted for 
many of the institutionalists’ observations 
regarding the operation of labor markets. 
The institutionalists were not eliminated, 
but they retreated into schools of industrial 
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relations and, less commonly, into business 
schools. This outcome notwithstanding, my 
goal in this paper is to reconsider institu-
tional labor economics (Ile) and make a 
renewed case for it. 
one stronghold of institutional thinking 
has been to research and explain the person-
nel practices of firms and, in particular, how 
they organize the rules of their internal labor 
markets (Ilms). understanding Ilms is an 
important arena for institutional theory be-
cause, at least as a first approximation, the 
very existence of administered employment 
rules seems to point to a different under-
standing of labor markets than that which 
emerges from invisible-hand models of sup-
ply and demand. In addition, the current 
period is witnessing a remarkable number of 
changes in how firms organize work. under-
standing what is driving these transforma-
tions is central to the intellectual agenda of 
the field, and this in turn at least raises the 
question of what value an institutional per-
spective can provide.
related to this point is that in the past sev-
eral decades, the standard templates for or-
ganizing work have lost their hold and we 
now observe substantial diversity in Ilms.1 
This diversity is not difficult to understand if 
1 There is considerable empirical work that demon-
strates diversity. At the anecdotal level, examples in-
clude the contrast in employment practices between 
Walmart and Costco (Greenhouse 2005; Cascio 2006), 
the divergence of Southwest Airlines from the practices 
of other large carriers, or the Hrm practices of the soft-
ware firm SAS compared to its competitors (Pfeffer 
1998). more systematic work within industries, such as 
automobiles and telecommunications, also points to 
the same conclusion. For example, in their study of tele-
communications and automobiles, Katz and Darbishire 
(1999: 4) reported that “within both union and non-
union sectors the extent of variation in wages, work 
practices, and other employment conditions has in-
creased.” In a review of the literature on call centers, 
batt and moynihan (2002) identified alternative ap-
proaches toward organizing work (which they labeled 
“mass production,” “professional service,” and “mass 
customization”). Drawing on a survey of 354 American 
call centers, they found that these models are all repre-
sented and the diversity of practices remained even 
after the sample was divided into centers serving resi-
dential and business customers. Additional evidence of 
the diversity of practices within customer segments is 
provided in batt (2002).
firms face different constraints; however, 
there is also diversity among firms that 
appear to be in the same economic circum-
stances, and this pattern suggests a role for 
institutional considerations. 
Despite the seeming appeal of institu-
tional factors for understanding these pat-
terns in recent years, in a replay of the old 
pattern, New Personnel economics (NPe) 
has emerged as a significant subfield of labor 
economics and has a tendency to be imperi-
alistic regarding its claims (lazear 2000). 
This line of research seeks to explain the 
personnel and Ilm practices of organiza-
tions from an optimization perspective. For 
example, NPe has addressed the general 
question of why Ilms exist, and has studied 
optimal compensation and promotion prac-
tices, retirement policies, and many other 
human resource topics. because NPe is con-
gruent with most of standard economic the-
ory, it has gone unchallenged. At the same 
time, the older tradition of institutional 
labor economics, appropriately updated, 
takes a different perspective, has a great deal 
to say on the same topics, and is worth a seri-
ous reconsideration. This is particularly true 
because somewhat below the radar screen 
more institutionally oriented scholars, many 
of whom are sociologists but some of whom 
are more direct descendants of the older in-
stitutionalists, have enlarged and deepened 
their own analysis of organizations. Hence 
the substance of institutional economics is 
deeper and more vital than has been hereto-
fore understood. 
the Argument 
There are three logical steps in a research 
program aimed at understanding Ilms. The 
first is to ask whether organizations have 
rules that at least nominally shape employ-
ment practices and outcomes. The second 
step is to determine whether these rules are 
binding in the sense that they lead to out-
comes that are different than those pre-
dicted by standard supply and demand 
models. Assuming that the answers to the 
first two steps are positive, the third step is to 
explain the origins of those rules and why 
they persist.
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The simple existence of Ilm rules is ac-
cepted by industrial relations scholars and 
has been so at least since the publication of 
Doeringer and Piore’s (1972) book on the 
subject. The second step in the chain of logic 
is more difficult because of the challenge of 
establishing the counterfactual (that is, what 
the results in a more standard labor market 
would look like) and testing against it. Firm-
level data are required because national 
datasets lack detail on the specific personnel 
practices that shape outcomes for the indi-
viduals who are surveyed. As a result, the re-
search that addresses this question typically 
studies individual firms although in some in-
stances the data come in the form of descrip-
tive or ethnographic accounts, and in other 
cases, of econometric analyses of personnel 
records. The sophisticated econometrics 
should not, however, obscure the fact that 
essentially each study deals with a sample of 
one or just a few firms. In this literature, NPe 
researchers have played an important role 
by providing more clarity about where ob-
served patterns diverge from those predicted 
by traditional labor economics (see for ex-
ample baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom 1994; 
Gibbs and Hendricks 2004; Gibbons and 
Waldman 2006). In general, it is fair to con-
clude that scholars in economics and indus-
trial relations accept the view that Ilm rules 
do in fact shape outcomes in ways that differ 
from those predicted by models that ignore 
the administrative rules of the firm. 
The debate arises regarding the third 
question—the origins and persistence of 
these Ilm rules. New Personnel economics 
(NPe), as summarized in lazear and Shaw 
(2007: 92), “is aimed at modeling firms’ use 
of optimal management practices.” The pro-
totypical research strategy in NPe is to iden-
tify a personnel practice that is empirically 
prevalent and to develop a model in which 
the practice in question emerges as the 
most efficient solution to the problem posed 
in the model. In other words, practices are 
seen as flowing from the firm’s effort to 
maximize efficiency. As a second step, NPe 
adopts the standard economics equilibrium 
assumption that if organizations err and 
adopt sub-optimal practices they will lose 
out in the competitive market. As a result, 
natural selection will enforce the diffusion 
and dominance of practices that flow from 
the optimizing models. 
In developing these models, NPe draws 
on four theoretical building blocks (Gibbons 
and Waldman 1999): human capital theory, 
optimal job assignment models, incentive 
contracting, and tournaments. The central 
ideas of each of these theoretical streams are 
well known. Human capital theory addresses 
the acquisition of skill and, in the context 
of a firm, the determination and conse-
quences of learning trajectories. Assignment 
models try to determine to what extent orga-
nizations can best match skills and job re-
quirements. Incentive contracting concerns 
solutions to the well-known agent-principal 
problem whereas tournament models focus 
on the use of promotions to provide incen-
tives and to sort employees by quality. 
I present the alternative institutional ap-
proach below. In making my argument, 
however, I want to make it clear that my 
claim is not that mainstream labor econom-
ics does not pay attention to institutions. 
Whatever merit this claim might have had in 
the past when the dominant research stream 
was human capital theory and earnings re-
gressions, it is certainly no longer true 
in 2011. A rich “standard” literature does 
examine the impact of minimum wages, 
unions, employment security legislation, 
temporary help agencies, and a variety of 
other labor market institutions. However, in 
this literature, institutions such as those just 
listed are viewed as external constraints on 
the firm and the model of firm behavior—
the one exemplified by NPe—remains one 
of optimizing a well-defined objective func-
tion subject to external constraints, whether 
they are supply and demand or external 
institutions. 
the Institutional Perspective
The central theoretical idea I develop 
below centers on an alternative perspective 
regarding firms’ decisions about how to or-
ganize work. In addressing this issue, I join 
others whose contributions have sought to 
elaborate on the meaning of institutional 
labor economics and to create space for this 
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school of thought (Jacoby 1990; Kaufman 
1994, 2004; marsden 1999). 
my argument proceeds in two stages. First, 
organizations are characterized by groups 
with competing objectives and perspectives 
regarding the legitimate purposes of the en-
terprise. Second, the Ilm outcomes we ob-
serve are the result of an internal political 
process that is made necessary by the need 
to resolve these conflicts. In this context, the 
optimizing pressures emphasized by NPe 
are important in the political contest, but 
they are only one of multiple “players”; the 
actual outcome we observe represents a 
particular resolution of the conflict. over 
time, depending in part on the external 
economic and political environment, the 
relative power of different internal constitu-
encies varies, which in turn leads to differ-
ences in the relative importance of NPe 
versus other considerations. In all periods, 
the group political process is important. 
Groups and ILMs
The importance of organized work 
groups in union and non-union as well as 
white- and blue-collar settings is well docu-
mented in a large and diverse ethnographic 
literature. Specifically, this literature estab-
lishes that these groups act collectively to 
pressure management to modify practices 
and policies. According to one literature 
review (a review that contains numerous 
citations), “Workers’ goals can include op-
positional elements that focus on resistance 
to management practices” (Hodson 1977: 
426). In another review, worker-management 
interaction is characterized as “managers 
and workers [acting] jointly to negotiate 
the trade-offs among management control, 
worker consent, and labor effort” (Choi, 
leiter, and Tomaskovic-Devey 2008: 423). It 
is important to understand that by “negoti-
ate” the authors refer to informal interac-
tion, pressure, and accommodation, and not 
to formal union-management collective bar-
gaining. It follows from the nature of these 
implicit negotiations and political struggles 
that the outcomes that we observe cannot be 
presumed to result from optimal decision-
making. It is not the case that the competing 
perspectives described above can simply be 
modeled as additional constraints to be con-
sidered by an optimizing leader.2
There are, of course, other models and 
ways of thinking that recognize that conflicts 
exist within organizations over goals and be-
havior. That point is not new, but what distin-
guishes the argument here is the emphasis 
on group rather than individual interests. 
The NPe approach to conflict focuses on 
principal-agent issues, but the core of this 
approach is the view that the individual is 
the focal actor and that person is seen as an 
atomistic and selfish utility maximizer look-
ing after his or her particular interests. 
Conversely, social psychologists emphasize a 
more expansive view of individual motiva-
tion (Pfeffer 2007; baron and Kreps, forth-
coming). As useful as this socio-psychological 
viewpoint is, however, once again it is impor-
tant to see that the discussion and examples 
used to support the argument center on 
individual-level behaviors such as the role of 
intrinsic motivation, the importance of reci-
procity and gift-exchange, status inconsis-
tency, the anchoring of expectations, and 
interpersonal comparisons of utility. The 
perspective I am developing here empha-
sizes instead group norms, conflict, and 
negotiation.3 
2 The idea that organizational behavior/decision-
making is not of the optimizing “machine model” mode 
has certainly been put forward before in the literature 
by both economists and sociologists. Cyret and march 
(1963: 31), in the Behavioral Theory Of The Firm, noted 
that organizations are coalitions and that “basic to the 
idea of a coalition is the expectation that the individual 
participants in the organization may have substantially 
different preference ordering (individual goals) . . . 
with the obvious potential for group conflict.” However, 
in the book, the authors emphasize the different goals 
and coalitions among functional units as they make 
business decisions (production, accounting, sales, and 
so on); they devote only two pages (186–87) to employ-
ment issues.
3 other efforts to introduce “social” considerations into 
standard models are also similarly limited. For example, 
robert Solow (1990) argued that the labor market is a 
“social institution”; however, he basically emphasized 
variants of efficiency wage models of wage determina-
tion and the macro-economic consequence of the fact 
that individuals respond to fairness considerations and 
salary norms. He did not discuss groups, group conflict, 
or competing visions of the objectives of the firm.
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This focus on group conflict over goals 
and rules is consistent with the work of many 
scholars who have recognized that firms con-
tain multiple groups with quite different 
perspectives on the legitimate objectives of 
the organization. Nearly a century ago John 
r. Commons wrote that “economic conflicts 
are not merely conflicts between individuals 
. . . but are conflicts between classifications 
or even classes of individuals” (quoted in 
Parsons 1963: 3) In his description of a 
French bureaucratic organization, michel 
Crozier  (1967: 298) wrote of “opposing 
forms of rationality.”
ILM Rules as the Result of  
a Political Process
The view that Ilm outcomes are the re-
sult of a political process that aims to resolve 
group-level conflict stands in contrast to 
what march and Simon (1958: 37) called the 
“machine model” of behavior. This is the 
view that organizations can been seen as al-
gorithms that take inputs, such as data on 
prices and production processes, and spit out 
the optimal response, which they then exe-
cute. one concern is that this view assumes 
an organizational computational capacity, 
doubts about which have long formed the 
basis of critiques (Cyert and march 1963; 
Nelson and Winter 1982). more fundamen-
tally, this machine model represents an inac-
curate characterization of organizational 
decision-making and is overly functional. As 
Jacoby (1990: 317) noted in his critique of 
standard theory, “There is a tendency to ra-
tionalize employment practices in functional 
or efficiency terms without regard to their 
historical-causal (how did the practice arise) 
. . . complexities.”4 
4 Granovetter (1985: 505) made a similar comment in 
reference to economic modeling more generally:
the main thrust . . . is to deflect the analysis of institu-
tions from sociological, historical, and legal argumenta-
tion and show instead that they arise as the efficient 
solution to economic problems. This mission and per-
vasive functionalism it implies discourages detailed 
analysis of social structure that I argue here is the key to 
understanding how existing institutions arrived at their 
present state.
In thinking about this political process, it 
is important to understand that although it 
may be tautologically true that there is a 
decision-maker who must sign off on a pol-
icy, that person does not in fact have the uni-
lateral power to impose an “optimal” decision 
but rather must take into account the views 
of constituencies within the organization as 
well as the power of those constituencies. 
once this point is accepted, then the door is 
opened for an institutional perspective on 
the determinants of Ilm rules.
An extended illustration of the political 
process perspective occurs in Gouldner’s 
(1954) classic Patterns of Industrial Bureau-
cracy. In a case study, he analyzed the origins 
and implementation of bureaucratic rules 
regarding issues such as attendance, safety, 
bidding for jobs, and effort, exploring how 
the firm created its internal labor market. 
He described how each rule came into being 
and argued that they were not based on a 
universal functional rationality but were in-
stead the result of competing interests. For 
example, he illustrated how the worldview 
and interests of several distinct groups 
of employees as well as both incumbent 
managers and newly hired outside managers 
differed from each other and how these dif-
ferences varied depending on the topic at 
hand. The point was not just simply that they 
had different self-interests, but that they also 
had different views about the underlying ra-
tionale of the organization and about what 
constituted appropriate and inappropriate 
behavior. As a result, its Ilm reflected a po-
litical and social process that resolved these 
conflicts. According to Gouldner, “rather 
than assuming that bureaucracy possesses a 
Gibraltar-like stability, the perspective directs 
attention into the tensions and problems 
evoked by bureaucratization” (p. 11).5
5 In another important contribution, Zald and berger 
(1978) applied social movement theory to organiza-
tions and identified three types of political conflict 
within organizations—coups d’etat, bureaucratic insur-
gency, and mass movements. The first type represents a 
struggle for power among the elite and is not relevant 
for the arguments developed here and the third is too 
episodic to be relevant. However, bureaucratic insur-
gencies can indeed represent ongoing struggles over 
the purposes and procedures of the organization that 
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in the direction of more general skills. See 
Gould (2002)).
All of the above certainly supports the no-
tion that some of what we observe today as 
Ilms can be understood via standard mod-
els as shifting constraints that lead firms to 
implement new ideas about organizations—
what Cappelli (1999) has characterized as 
“market-in”—such as new uses of on-site 
suppliers, increased utilization of contrac-
tors and outsourcers, and innovations in 
pay-for-performance. In the empirical mate-
rial presented in the next section, I begin 
with a discussion of the history of the emer-
gence of Ilms, and it will be apparent that 
the power of optimizing considerations has 
indeed been stronger in some periods than 
in others. At all times it has remained true, 
however, that understanding the particular 
ways in which the economic pressures are re-
fracted through institutional considerations 
is essential for a full understanding of the 
origins and operation of the practices that 
we observe. Groups within organizations 
seek to redirect pressures to effect change to 
satisfy their own interests and the actual Ilm 
rules that emerge reflect this institutional 
fact of life.
evidence
The arguments developed above point to 
an understanding of the evolution of Ilms 
that combines pressures for economic opti-
mization with the kind of institutional con-
siderations that are often overlooked in the 
literature. I illustrate this perspective by of-
fering five examples: (a) the historical emer-
gence of Ilms and present-day political 
struggles over occupational boundaries, 
(b) the slow diffusion of High Performance 
Work Systems, (c) the strategies of firms to 
obtain increased levels of effort and commit-
ment from their workforce, (d) the use of 
contingent employees, and (e) the spread of 
new promotion rules in response to equal 
employment opportunity pressures. In dis-
cussing each example, my approach will 
be to identify the political contenders 
seeking to shape the nature of the Ilm prac-
tice at hand. The kind of considerations 
emphasized by NPe models are important, 
Dynamics Over time
The institutional perspective I offer here 
challenges the view that Ilm rules emerge 
from an optimization calculation. Within or-
ganizations, the urge towards optimization 
and efficiency competes with other objec-
tives held by powerful constituencies. The 
form that Ilms take—the nature of the per-
sonnel rules—can only be understood as 
flowing from a complex interaction of these 
objectives and interests. This competition 
for policy includes an important role for 
group-level factors such as norms and cus-
toms, social structure, competing interests, 
search for legitimization, and power.6
That said, the viewpoint that I present 
leaves ample room for NPe-type consider-
ations as represented by constituencies in 
the organization that place a high value on 
standard efficiency considerations. In recent 
years, as competitive pressures on firms have 
increased, many older Ilm practices have 
seemed more costly and hence the pressure 
to change them has grown. In addition, NPe 
scholars might also plausibly argue that un-
derlying technologies have shifted in ways 
that affect optimal retention policies (e.g., 
are driven by competing views of appropriate objectives 
held by different groups.
6 There is an NPe literature on organizational politics, 
but it remains at the level of individuals and how they 
maximize their self-interest rather than at the level of 
group political contests over rules. For example, lazear 
(1989) examined whether wage compression is good or 
bad for efficiency given that it may enhance coopera-
tion but perhaps also reduce incentives for the best em-
ployees. However, he asked how individuals react to 
different wage distributions with respect their private 
self-interest, and he maintained the view that there is a 
decision-maker within the firm who can set the optimal 
wage structure. In another effort along these lines, 
Prendergast and Topel (1996) modeled the behavior of 
supervisors who exhibit favoritism towards particular 
employees. but, again, the modeling is purely at the in-
dividual level. Supervisors simply “like” some workers 
and not others: there is no sense of group action or in-
terest. Finally, Gibbons and Waldman (1999: 2409) dis-
cussed politics; once again, this is on a purely individual 
level. As they put it, “In our usage political models are 
slightly different from agency models. both describe in-
teractions between individuals at different levels of a 
hierarchy . . . [but] in political models the supervisor’s 
actions cannot be governed by a contract.”
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but they must compete with the exigencies 
of various internal constituencies. The 
final resolution—the Ilm practices that we 
observe—are the result of this political 
competition.
Job Ladders and ILMs
Ilms emerged gradually among American 
firms from roughly the beginning of the 
twentieth century until the beginning of the 
Depression and then accelerated in their 
diffusion and took on a somewhat different 
form with the arrival of the New Deal and 
the rapid growth of union power (Jacoby 
2004; Kaufman 2008). underlying the NPe 
story is firms’ efforts to find more efficient 
ways to manage increasingly large organiza-
tions as well as their need, which has 
varied over the business cycle, to limit their 
turnover costs. Turnover is costly because it 
entails a waste of human capital, and in a 
high-turnover organization, provision and 
investment in on-the-job training is prob-
lematic. In order to reduce turnover, com-
pensation is back-loaded, which leads to a 
system in which people spend long periods 
of time with the same employer. This effect is 
intensified by the nature of human capital 
acquisition. The early investments in train-
ing need to be rewarded over time, from the 
perspective of both the employees and the 
firm, again implying long careers. 
 In some versions of the human capital 
story, there is also a process by which firms 
need time to learn about the abilities of their 
employees, which implies firm-based careers 
(e.g. Farber and Gibbons 1996). The incen-
tive interpretation is somewhat different in 
that it is less about skills and more about be-
havior. According to this line of thinking, 
Ilms help resolve agent-principal problems 
by creating long-term employment settings 
in which opportunism can be minimized be-
cause there is always another round in the 
game (Williamson 1975).
The institutional argument regarding the 
rise of Ilms takes two tacks. The first points 
to the role of unions in pressing firms to ra-
tionalize their employment practices in gen-
eral as well as to adopt specific practices such 
as seniority-based promotion. The second 
refers to the role of the profession, which 
acts in its own self-interest by encouraging 
the diffusion of formal employment prac-
tices, which then require a personnel staff to 
administer.
The evidence shows that both the NPe 
and the institutional stories were important 
over the course of the twentieth century. At 
the turn of the century, American firms—
even large ones—did not have well-developed 
internal labor markets. Instead, they man-
aged their workforce via the so-called “drive 
system,” in which substantial discretionary 
(often arbitrary) power was put in the hands 
of the foreman (Jacoby 2004). Turnover was 
high and thus problematic during periods of 
growth and labor shortage; this situation led 
to efforts to stabilize the workforce via cre-
ation of job ladders and personnel systems. 
In his history of the rise of human resource 
management (Hrm), Kaufman (2008: 295) 
explained that in the pre-New Deal period 
“Hrm moved up and down in response to 
the threat exerted by unions and govern-
ment.” Despite this claim, Kaufman placed 
more explanatory weight on the problems 
posed by managing large organizations 
(ibid.: 300). Previously, Jacoby (2004: 102) 
had written that “employers now found per-
sonnel management an attractive alterna-
tive, one that promised to simultaneously 
relieve labor shortages, improve productiv-
ity, and promote labor peace.” moreover, 
Jacoby related the ebb and flow of the adop-
tion of Ilms to shifting pressures of supply 
and demand in the external labor market 
(ibid.: 129). other correlates included firm 
size and the stability of their product de-
mand (ibid.: 143). 
With the onset of the Depression, the 
relative importance of the different consid-
erations shifted. In sectors that were union-
ized, internal political pressures led firms to 
establish the formal job ladders and senior-
ity systems that characterize industrial Ilms. 
Non-union firms then imitated these systems 
to avoid unionization. In addition, person-
nel specialists within firms actively promoted 
the formalization of employment practices, 
a point of view that was clearly in their self-
interest. Indeed, during the period spanning 
the Depression and World War II, there was 
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very little correlation between the standard 
optimizing explanations of Ilms—firms’ size 
and turnover rates—and the adoption of 
specific formal personnel practices (baron, 
Dobbin, and Jennings 1986). 
The core conclusion to draw from this 
material is that when it comes to understand-
ing how the prototypical Ilm of the post-war 
period emerged, the story is considerably 
more complex than what NPe models imply, 
and this complexity is consistent with the in-
stitutional perspective developed above. 
There was certainly considerable room for 
the play of market forces and efficiency- 
maximizing considerations, but joined to 
these were the actions of two important in-
terest groups within firms—unions and per-
sonnel professionals—as well as the actions 
of an external institution, the government. 
Ilms can only be understood as resulting 
from the interaction of these “actors” as they 
used their resources to pressure organiza-
tions in the directions that they preferred.
The role of internal political struggles 
over the shape of Ilms is an ongoing story, 
not limited to a particular historical episode. 
A powerful illustration of this point is the 
extensive literature on the determination of 
boundaries among occupations, the struggle 
over which is essentially a group-level con-
flict over the definition of jobs and steps in 
the ladder of an Ilm. At the core of this 
struggle, and central to the literature, is 
a rejection of the idea that there is some 
natural order regarding which tasks are as-
signed to which professions or occupations 
(Abbott 1988). The creation of boundaries 
and steps in the job ladder is, rather, the re-
sult of political conflict, some of which is 
carried out in the public arena via profes-
sional societies and licensing authorities, 
and some of which takes place within the 
firm. A classic example concerns disputes in 
the medical field among doctors, nurses, 
and medical technicians over who can do 
what for a patient (Freidson 1970), a contest 
that is ongoing and is fueled by changes 
in technology and external shifts in funding. 
even among doctors there are internal 
political tensions, such as those between in-
ternists and specialists over who can treat 
which conditions. Abbot (1988) provided a 
wide range of examples of struggles of 
this kind in fields such as information tech-
nology, law, medicine, engineering, and 
construction. The literature on how self- 
conscious groups engage in political strug-
gles within organizations to define the scope 
of their tasks and to protect themselves 
against competing groups is not limited to a 
few elite occupations requiring highly edu-
cated workers. barley (1986) and Nelson 
and barley (1997) provided a wide range of 
evidence of similar processes in a range of 
“lower level” technical occupations.
The point, for the purposes of this paper, 
is the ample evidence of self-conscious 
groups engaged in a power struggle over the 
shape of job ladders within an organization. 
It would be difficult to understand the re-
sulting Ilm as simply the outcome of an op-
timizing process by managers who survey the 
technology and tasks and decide upon the 
most efficient way to structure work. 
the slow Diffusion of High  
Performance Work systems
High Performance Work Systems (HPWS), 
which involve the use of teams and various 
forms of quality programs, have been imple-
mented in a range of firms (osterman 1994; 
osterman 2000; Handel and Gittleman 
2004) because there is considerable evidence 
that they lead to higher levels of quality and 
productivity (Kochan and osterman 1994; 
macDuffie 1995; Ichniowski, Shaw, and 
Prennushi 1997; Pfeffer 2007). Despite this 
evidence, their adoption has been slow; this 
implies, as Pfeffer has observed, that money 
has been left on the table. even when ad-
opted, the final form that the work organiza-
tion takes is often not in line with the initial 
expectations of management.
The role of internal political struggles 
between groups of employees and manage-
ment is apparent in accounts of the adop-
tion of HPWS or the lack thereof. In a 
case study of non-union and white-collar 
Hewlett-Packard employees, beer and Can-
non (2004) examined why an effort to im-
plement pay-for-performance compensation 
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failed. They found that teams of employees 
resisted because of fears of unexpected 
changes in their compensation levels; the 
employees’ resistance took the form of 
refusing new job assignments and refusing 
to admit new members to their teams. beer 
and Cannon concluded that the process 
was one of “implicit negotiation” and that 
“high commitment [work systems] can only 
be created if employees . . . feel fairly treated 
and this in turn is a function of how much 
voice they have” (pp. 14, 17). other non-
union examples include the observation 
that first-line supervisors resist High Perfor-
mance Work organization (HPWo) because 
they feel threatened by the role of self- 
managed teams in taking over some of their 
functions (Coyle-Shapiro 1999).
Case studies in unionized settings lead 
to the same conclusion. The poster-child is 
the automobile industry, in which tensions 
between local unions and management 
often delayed or reshaped the implementa-
tion of HPWS (Kochan, lansbury, and 
macDuffie 1997). more broadly, the litera-
ture reports similar issues. unions can be op-
positional when their adversary function is 
threatened by the more cooperative nature 
of HPWo systems (Walton, mcKersie, and 
Cutcher-Gershenfeld 1994) and manage-
ment resists giving up its power to groups of 
employees (for a useful review of failed 
HPWo partnerships in unionized settings, 
see Kochan et al. 2009, Ch. 2). 
The case study research is supported 
by survey methods, although the surveys 
themselves cannot by their very nature pro-
vide as textured a picture. For example, in 
their survey of the adoption of HPWo prac-
tices across a sample of automobile firms, 
Pil and macDuffie (1996) found that vari-
ables capturing the presence or absence of 
internal organizational barriers and resis-
tance perform better than simple measures 
of economic performance. moreover, as the 
Hewlett-Packard case makes clear, this pat-
tern extends well beyond the unionized sec-
tor of the job market. Whether and how a 
firm adopts these practices is due to much 
more than simply an optimizing decision by 
senior managers. 
effort and commitment
obtaining higher levels of employee com-
mitment is important in markets in which 
quality and customer satisfaction are key to 
competitive success. As a consequence, an-
other recent development is new strategies 
by firms aimed at addressing this need.
NPe approaches employee effort and 
commitment from the perspective of effi-
ciency wages and incentive compensation 
models grounded in principal-agent theory. 
These perspectives are somewhat different 
in that efficiency wage/shirking models con-
cern level of effort whereas in principal-
agent models the issue is that the effort may 
flow in the wrong direction, that is, in the 
self-interest of the agent rather than of the 
principal. What both perspectives have in 
common, however, is the view that effort is 
largely decided at the level of the individual 
and the key to any solution is to get that indi-
vidual’s incentives correct.
An empirical illustration of this perspec-
tive, and evidence that it has power, is 
lazear’s (2000) research on Safelite glass. 
Prominently cited in the literature, the study 
discusses the consequence of introducing 
piecework pay systems for auto-glass install-
ers. The research indicated that the install-
ers responded to these incentives and there 
was a selection process in which the less able 
employees quit the organization. The point, 
then, is that people do indeed respond as 
predicted to financial incentives; at the same 
time, it is important to remember that the 
circumstances of Safelite were special. out-
put was easily measured and monitored and 
employees worked individually, not in teams 
or groups. Nevertheless, one can take the 
point that incentives are important.
Although it is clear that incentives as con-
ventionally understood play a role in eliciting 
effort, group processes of the sort empha-
sized by the institutional perspective are also 
central. The level of effort delivered by the 
workforce is at least partially determined at 
the group level and by considerations other 
than incentive schemes. Consider Toyota 
or Southwest Airlines, both of which are 
probably taught in Hr courses even more 
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frequently than Safelite. These firms are tre-
mendously successful in their industries and 
both are widely known for obtaining high lev-
els of effort from their workforce. They are 
also successful in obtaining organizational 
commitment, an idea that is basically foreign 
to NPe thinking (lincoln and Kalleberg 
1990). In contrast to NPe expectations, how-
ever, both are quite conventional in their in-
centive systems (and this is as true of Toyota 
of America as it is of Toyota of Japan) and in 
both organizations seniority (frequently 
seen in the NPe literature as the enemy of 
meritocracy) is important. Why is it that 
these organizations are able to obtain excep-
tional effort and organizational commitment 
while other firms with essentially the same 
compensation arrangements are not? The 
answer lies in factors that institutionalists 
emphasize: group norms and culture.
In thinking about this, it is important to 
recognize that norms and culture are group 
phenomena and not examples of the kind of 
individual-level social-psychological exam-
ples discussed above. It is also important to 
contrast this perspective with the individual-
ist viewpoint typical in the NPe literature. 
Consider, for example, the comment made 
by roberts (2004: 177) in his widely cited 
book on the internal economics of organiza-
tions: “While motivation problems can be 
manifested at the group level, we focus our 
discussion on the problems of motivating in-
dividuals because these are logically prior 
and because most of the arguments are more 
directly made in this context.” This perspec-
tive misses the fundamental point that group 
behavior and group objectives are not sim-
ply the aggregation of the behavior and ob-
jectives of individual actors.
There is a long tradition in institutional 
research of recognizing that group culture 
and norms are important. Seashore (1954) 
showed that norms operate at the group 
level, Dunlop (1957: 130) emphasized the 
importance of custom in both the short- and 
long-run process of wage determination, and 
roy (1959) described how group processes 
lead to withholding of effort. In its more 
modern form, organizational culture is a 
rapidly growing research field (barley, meyer, 
and Gash 1988; martin 1992). 
At both Southwest Airlines and Toyota, 
employees have developed strong group 
commitments to the success of the organiza-
tion (Womack, Jones, and roos 1997; Pfeffer 
1998; Gittell 2003; rubinstein and Kochan 
2001). It is important to avoid romanticizing 
these organizational cultures, however, for 
Southwest has had labor trouble on occasion 
with its pilots and Toyota has worked very 
hard to keep out the united Automobile 
Workers. Nevertheless, it is clear to observers 
(see the citations above) that at the level of 
the workgroup each organization has suc-
ceeded in obtaining effort via broadly shared 
norms and not simply because of individual 
incentives or individual gift-exchange.7
There is also a very large ethnographic lit-
erature that generalizes the point of the 
Southwest and Toyota examples, suggesting 
that the reality is that the workforce essen-
tially engages in a bargaining process with 
management over effort, a negotiation that 
can be informal—not linked to formal col-
lective bargaining or the presence of a union. 
Culture and norms represent the “opening 
position” of the workforce, and what ensues 
is implicit negotiation between employees 
and management over effort. 
 We have already seen an example of 
this in the Gouldner (1954) study cited 
above, in which employee views about the 
legitimacy of management-specific practices 
varied; if the practices (Ilm rules) were 
seen as illegitimate, then effort was withheld 
(pp. 161–62). This pattern was found to be 
important in a broad range of published eth-
nographic workplace studies surveyed by 
Hodson (1999). The ethnographies repre-
sented in his survey were undertaken in 
both unionized and non-unionized factories 
as well as in white-collar settings such as 
banks and restaurants. Hodson systemati-
cally compiled and coded the reports and 
7 The understanding that culture and norms are impor-
tant in eliciting effort may be foreign to NPe but is 
increasingly shared in the broader economics litera-
ture. There remains a tendency, however, to cling to 
the notion of a decision-maker within the firm who, 
with this more sophisticated understanding, optimizes 
the firm’s organizational structure and culture to obtain 
effort (Akerlof and Kranton 2005).
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then examined the relationship between 
management adherence to work group 
norms and the degree of effort provided by 
the labor force. by norms, he meant group-
level expectations about fair treatment as 
well as expectations regarding the organiza-
tion of work and of production. by effort, he 
meant what he termed “resistance behav-
iors” such as acting dumb and sabotaging, as 
well as “citizenship behaviors,” such as offer-
ing ideas, training peers, and providing extra 
effort. The coded research demonstrated a 
strong and significant relationship between 
management adherence to work group 
norms and citizenship behaviors. This re-
search represents strong evidence of implicit 
bargaining between groups of employees 
and management over a core element of 
the Ilm.
strategies For Using contingent 
employees
The use of temporary workers has surged 
in recent years and is an important element 
in the fraying of closed Ilms (Autor 2003; 
Hausman and osawa 2003). one explana-
tion consistent with the NPe approach is 
that firms often use contingent work as a 
strategy for managing the compensation ri-
gidities that result from the persistence of 
fixed-wage differentials based on work group 
ideas of fairness (Abraham and Taylor 1996). 
related to this is the view that contingent 
employment enables firms to avoid the con-
straints that some courts have imposed via 
restrictions on the employment-at-will doc-
trine (Autor 2003). What ties these views to-
gether is that contingent work is seen as an 
effort to avoid Ilm rules and to return to a 
more classical labor market. Again, there is 
certainly good reason to believe that these 
considerations are important. In practice, 
however, they are in a political contest with 
more institutional considerations.
An institutional perspective would begin 
by observing that the motivations for 
contingent work outlined above originate 
in the strength of institutional constraints 
on the firms’ employment practices and 
hence the spread of contingent employ-
ment in a sense indirectly acknowledges the 
power of institutional considerations. At the 
same time, institutional considerations are 
more than a backdrop against which contin-
gent work is played out: they shape how 
it is used, that is, the rules that govern its 
implementation.
An example occurs in the ethnographic 
research of Smith and Neuwirth (2008), who 
studied how a temporary help firm inter-
acted with both the Hr staff and the line 
managers of a client firm. How the temps 
were utilized was the result of a complicated 
three-way political process within the organi-
zation with each interest group having a dis-
tinct perspective. The Hr group struggled 
to maintain its role and status, line manage-
ment sought flexibility, and the temp agency 
not only searched for business but also 
negotiated the relationship between the two 
internal factions. According to Smith and 
Neuwirth, “What appear to be purely market-
mediated employment relationships are con-
structed in the negotiations and occasional 
struggles between Hr staff, line manage-
ment, and personnel from labor market in-
termediaries” (p. 143).
Similar struggles occur between manag-
ers and regular employees. When firms use 
temps they have to pay attention to the reac-
tions of the regular workforce, and the spe-
cifics of the Ilm rules around temps are 
often shaped by the need to maintain 
status differentials. In her study of a boston 
area call center and a manufacturing firm, 
lautsch (2002) observed that the balance of 
relations between the two employee groups 
was a central concern of managers as they 
decided how to implement contingent work. 
She noted that “regular workers favored the 
maintenance of status differences between 
themselves and temporary workers” (p. 30). 
In response, management “assert[ed] that 
[it] would limit the scope of contingent work 
and its impact on regular jobs” (p. 32). 
lautsch added that “management learned 
. . . that regular workers would rebel if teams 
were set up so that temporary workers had 
majority membership, or so that temporary 
workers were in supervisory roles over 
regular staff. Gradually these practices were 
eliminated” (p. 34). In short, efficiency con-
siderations were important and managers 
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pressed forward with the use of temps as a 
source of cost savings, but the manner in 
which they were used and rules governing 
their work were significantly shaped by 
institutional factors.
Due Process and equal Opportunity
Although little remarked on by NPe schol-
ars, one of the most widespread shifts in 
Ilms—a shift certainly as important and as 
widespread as the diffusion of performance-
based pay—has been the implementation of 
a broad range of personnel practices associ-
ated with equal employment opportunity 
and with non-union due process and griev-
ance procedures. These practices obviously 
have important implications for career path-
ways and promotions within firms 
A large literature has emerged seeking 
to explain the origins of these practices 
within firms. much of it is rooted in the 
“institutional” stream of thought in organi-
zational sociology, which focuses on how 
organizations adopt practices to legitimize 
themselves in the eyes of other powerful ac-
tors or because the practices enhance the 
power of interest groups within the organi-
zation (Selznick 1949; Dimaggio and Powell 
1983). The latter perspective is clearly con-
gruent with the argument I have been devel-
oping here. The challenge is to distinguish 
the institutional explanations from more 
efficiency-based arguments claiming that the 
adopted practices make economic sense for 
the organization.
Although it is not always possible to prove 
definitively that efficiency considerations are 
unimportant, the body of research taken as a 
whole does convincingly demonstrate that 
institutional considerations have played a 
central role in the diffusion of the new prac-
tices and in determining the specific forms 
that they have taken. In an early foray into 
this field, edelman (1990) studied the adop-
tion of grievance procedures in non-union 
firms, specifically by sampling 52 firms in the 
San Francisco bay Area. Her broad argu-
ment was that organizations adopted these 
practices not because of any specific legal 
mandate (there was none), nor because of 
unions (the firms were non-union and a vari-
able measuring whether they faced a union 
threat was insignificant). rather, it appeared 
that the general normative environment 
coming out of the Civil rights movement 
placed a heavy moral or societal weight on 
firms to build “fairness” into their proce-
dures, and firms with personnel departments 
were more likely to respond to this pressure.
In later research edelman, Abraham, and 
erlanger (1992) placed even more empha-
sis on the role of personnel departments 
in pushing for practices that were self- 
aggrandizing. Specifically, they studied firms’ 
adoption of practices related to wrongful 
dismissal charges and showed that the per-
sonnel profession as a whole systematically 
exaggerated the risks that firms faced in 
these law suits, in some cases using estimates 
that were “absurd” (p. 65) and in other cases 
simply misleading (by, for example, report-
ing data from California as if it applied to all 
states). As result, senior managers were con-
vinced to implement personnel practices 
that enhanced the power and role of the 
personnel professionals.
In yet another set of studies, Dobbin et al. 
(1993) and Dobbin and Sutton (1998) 
examined the adoption of promotion poli-
cies in response to equal employment op-
portunity mandates from the Federal 
Government. There is certainly an underly-
ing efficiency explanation in that firms faced 
the risks of lawsuits and contract loss if they 
did not respond in some way. However, un-
derlying the specific practices that emerged 
are important subtleties. First, Dobbin 
et al. showed that the particular practices 
adopted
converged on a set of personnel practices that 
were isomorphic with the procedurally oriented, 
quasi-judicial administrative configuration of the 
federal government—formal, merit-based, em-
ployment and promotion conventions complete 
with an internal system of grievance adjudication. 
(p. 402)
In other words, the particular practices that 
were adopted were based upon an imitation 
of those of the more powerful external orga-
nization, not upon an internal optimization 
logic. of course, an NPe response to this 
might point to the search and information 
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savings that such an approach might bring. 
Dobbin and Sutton (1998), however, dem-
onstrated that even after federal pressures 
sharply diminished in the reagan years, and 
hence the costs of non-compliance fell 
sharply, personnel professionals continued 
to press for new practices, and they shifted 
their rhetoric from that of legal risk to the 
alleged internal benefits of diversity. Put 
differently, the personnel staff constructed 
(without any evidence) a new argument 
once the legal risk argument was no longer 
valid. A fair reading of this literature is not to 
suggest that efficiency explanations were un-
important or irrelevant; rather, it is to say 
that they are strikingly incomplete and per-
haps even naive with respect to the forces 
that drove the adoption of the wide range of 
personnel practices associated with equal 
employment opportunity and fairness in 
the workplace. The self-interest of a specific 
group within the firm, as it competed for 
resources and power, was a big part of the 
story.
conclusion
In this paper, I have aimed to describe an 
institutional perspective on Ilms that recog-
nizes the role of standard efficiency and 
market considerations yet at the same time 
brings to bear a deeper understanding of 
how organizations make decisions about or-
ganizing work. one central characteristic of 
my argument is that it does not develop a 
universal model parallel to the universalistic 
tendencies of neo-classical economic theory.8 
rather, my argument is pitched at the level 
of the firm or organization. Nor does it ad-
dress the psychology of individuals (whether 
they are utility maximizers or not) or the op-
eration of external markets. The creation of 
employment rules within organizations is 
the terrain on which I think that institutional 
ideas have the most purchase.
It is important in this context to under-
stand that even at the level of the organiza-
tion, the approach proposed here does not 
8 I am grateful to Sandy Jacoby for clarifying this point 
for me.
reject market forces, for this would be fool-
ish indeed and particularly so in a period 
when established forms of work organization 
are under a great deal of pressure from com-
petition. rather, my goal has been to develop 
a more sophisticated understanding of the 
dynamics of Internal labor markets. The 
central proposition, one which has a long 
tradition in the literature, is that these sys-
tems are the result of a political process in 
which groups with competing objectives and 
norms play out a contest. market or effi-
ciency considerations are certainly one 
player in this contest, and in the examples I 
have presented I have made an effort to 
give them their due. but they are not the 
only player. It is also important to recognize 
that the resources available to the different 
players in this contest will vary over time. It 
would not be unreasonable, for example, to 
argue that in the period spanning the De-
pression and World War II, the external en-
vironment favored internal actors who 
opposed NPe-style thinking whereas today, 
cost-minimization advocates hold an advan-
tage. but this ebb and flow does not alter the 
fundamental argument.
At the same time that market forces 
are given their due, it is also important to 
understand that the institutional consider-
ations emphasized here are persistent 
and are not simply transitory aberrations 
that will be quickly eliminated by the force 
of competition. First, the market has proven 
to be very slow in extinguishing long- 
standing practices, as the history of the 
automobile industry makes clear. In addi-
tion, important streams of research and the-
ory in economic models of technology 
adoption, the sociology of organizations, 
and political science models of institutional 
change all argue that the forces of path de-
pendence are strong and that practices be-
come locked in.9
The emphasis on group processes and 
politics, however, points to an important 
limitation of this paper: the question, not 
9 See, for example, Nelson and Winter (1982); Arthur 
(1989); Hannan and Feeman (1984); Stinchcomb 
(1965); and Thelen (2004).
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clean and elegant than are NPe models. 
moreover, these arguments do run the risk 
of devolving into what has been a weakness 
of institutional theory, namely a tendency 
simply to provide a long list of factors that 
should be taken into account, without any 
strategy for assigning relative importance or 
for testing the arguments. To say that institu-
tional theory runs this risk, however, is not to 
say that it should be abandoned. rather, ad-
vocates of institutional models have to be 
willing to be clear about their arguments 
and about the strategies they use for testing 
them. The gains from such an effort should 
be a richer understanding of how employ-
ment systems are evolving and what drives 
their evolution.
addressed here, of how groups are formed 
and re-reformed. This, of course, goes to the 
issue of how people and collectivities come 
to identify themselves as having commonali-
ties and how they frame what they regard as 
legitimate interests and goals. Although this 
is a topic of growing interest (barley 1989; 
Scully and Segal 2002; Piore and Safford 
2006;), it would take this paper too far afield 
to enter into it.
The goal of good social science should be 
to understand the determinants of the em-
pirical realities that we observe, both at a 
point in time and as they change. elegant 
theory is not an end in itself. This is impor-
tant to understand because the arguments 
developed in this paper are certainly less 
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